Power Under Pressure
Written by Ian Hirst, Cyber Threat Services Partner at Talan
As geopolitical rivalry sharpens and artificial intelligence accelerates offensive tradecraft, the UK’s energy sector is becoming a more attractive target for state-sponsored cyber activity. Long-term resilience will depend less on passing audits and more on understanding how adversaries think, prepare, and adapt.
“The most dangerous compromise in critical infrastructure is often not the loudest attack, but the quiet access held in reserve for a future crisis.”
Cyber risk in energy now sits at the intersection of geopolitics, industrial policy, and national resilience. The World Economic Forum’s Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2026 found that 64% of organisations factor geopolitically motivated cyberattacks into their planning. The UK government’s latest consultation on cyber resilience in downstream gas and electricity reinforces this, arguing that the entire energy system is now an attractive target and that resilience expectations must keep pace.
The strategic concern is not only disruption — it is pre-positioning. Allied warnings over the last two years have shown that state-sponsored actors are seeking persistent access to critical infrastructure, often by abusing legitimate tools already present in the environment. The Volt Typhoon case showed how “living off the land” techniques allow malicious activity to blend into normal administration. For energy operators, this changes the risk calculation: an intrusion may be valuable to an adversary even without immediate operational effect, because access itself can be kept for signalling, coercion, or activation during a geopolitical crisis.
Artificial intelligence is intensifying the problem by making established tradecraft faster and easier to scale. The National Cyber Security Centre assesses that threat actors are already using AI to enhance reconnaissance, vulnerability research, social engineering, and malware development. Its judgement through to 2027 is that AI increases the frequency and intensity of intrusions by compressing the attack cycle, meaning faster target development, more convincing lures, and less decision time for defenders.
Energy is especially exposed because its digital transformation is both essential and destabilising. The UK Energy Digitalisation Framework describes digitalisation as fundamental to managing an increasingly complex, decentralised energy system. Yet the International Energy Agency reports that cyberattacks on energy utilities have tripled over the past four years. This is the central paradox: the connectivity needed for flexibility, decarbonisation, and distributed generation also expands the attack surface across cloud platforms, operational technology, field devices, and third-party suppliers.
European evidence confirms the trend is hardening. ENISA reported over two hundred cyber incidents targeting the energy sector in 2023, with more than half directed at Europe. The December 2025 attack on Poland’s energy system, targeting around 30 renewable energy assets including wind and solar sites, suggests adversaries are looking beyond large, centralised assets towards the decentralised edge, where ownership, visibility, and security maturity vary widely.
Three evidence-based judgements now stand out. Hostile cyber activity will increasingly focus on suppliers, remote administration paths, and IT-to-OT dependencies, because those routes offer covert access and asymmetric leverage. Distributed energy resources will attract more adversary attention as systems decentralise further and as threat actors test whether disruption can be achieved below the threshold of major national outages. And AI will widen the gap between mature and immature defenders by increasing attacker tempo without requiring a matching increase in personnel.
This is why compliance, while necessary, is no longer sufficient. A baseline control framework shows diligence but does not answer the harder strategic questions: which adversaries matter most, where they are likely to gain access, which dependencies could fail under pressure, and which operations must survive a sustained cyber crisis.
The organisations that will build genuine resilience are those adopting intelligence-led security: threat-informed architecture, continuous attack-surface understanding, realistic supplier assurance, deeper operational visibility, and crisis exercising built around adversary behaviour rather than checklist scenarios. In a more contested geopolitical environment, the strongest energy organisations will not be those that merely pass audit. They will be those that understand the threat early enough to adapt before pressure turns into disruption.
About the author
Ian Hirst is a Partner in Cyber Threat Services at Talan UK delivering specialist threat intelligence across critical sectors including critical national infrastructure, healthcare, energy, retail, and defence manufacturing.